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Abstract
Animals often use social information about conspecifics in making decisions about cooperation and conflict. While the
importance of kin selection in the evolution of intraspecific cooperation and conflict is widely acknowledged, few studies
have examined how relatedness influences the evolution of social information use. Here we specifically examine how
relatedness affects the evolution of a stylised form of social information use known as eavesdropping. Eavesdropping
involves individuals escalating conflicts with rivals observed to have lost their last encounter and avoiding fights with those
seen to have won. We use a game theoretical model to examine how relatedness affects the evolution of eavesdropping,
both when strategies are discrete and when they are continuous or mixed. We show that relatedness influences the
evolution of eavesdropping, such that information use peaks at intermediate relatedness. Our study highlights the
importance of considering kin selection when exploring the evolution of complex forms of information use.
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Introduction
Animals frequently rely on information about conspecifics in
making decisions regarding mate choice, cooperation or conflicts
over resources [1,2,3]. Such information can be provided
‘intentionally’, as in the case of signalling, or inadvertently, such
as when an individual’s actions or their consequences may be
observed by others [2,3,4]. Gathering information about conspe-
cifics can both help to promote cooperation, as in the case of
image scoring [5,6], or help to resolve conflicts, as in the case of
eavesdropping [7]. In image scoring, individuals react to observed
cooperation between others by offering help to partners that were
previously seen helping others, and refusing help to partners that
were unhelpful [8]. A similar situation occurs in eavesdropping,
where individuals observe conflicts and use this information by
fighting individuals that lost their last encounter and avoiding
fights with individuals that won [7]. This type of social information
use has been demonstrated in animals (e.g. [9]) and represents a
heuristic that may improve an individual’s expected outcome from
an interaction, but with smaller investments in cognitive capacity
and information-gathering than more accurate decision rules, such
as full Bayesian updating over a series of interactions.
Almost all social interactions inherently involve interactions
with related individuals [10,11]. Such interactions can help to
promote cooperation and resolve conflict between individuals
[12,13,14]. For example, in the case of animal conflict, it has been
shown that higher relatedness between partners favours less
escalation (i.e. playing ‘dove’) in the classic hawk-dove game [15].
However, models of social information use in animal conflict and
cooperation generally ignore the potential impact that interactions
between relatives can have on the evolution of a given behaviour.
In a previous model of eavesdropping [7], it was assumed that
interactions take place randomly between individuals in an
infinitely large population. However, real populations often exhibit
population structure: interactions do not take place randomly but
rather take place between relatives more commonly than would be
predicted by chance in a well-mixed population. Such structure
can arise through kin recognition, territorial behaviour, or as a
result of limited dispersal. In structured populations, selection
should favour individuals that help or avoid conflict with relatives,
as well as those that are able to make the most of their interactions
with non-relatives. Monitoring simple social cues through
eavesdropping potentially addresses both of these criteria, by
allowing players to condition their behaviour on information
about individual opponents.
In this paper we examine how relatedness affects the evolution
of information use in an eavesdropping game. We model the
classic hawk-dove game [16] with eavesdropping [7] and with
interactions between relatives. We use two variants of the model –
one with discrete strategies and one with continuous strategies – as
these variants are known to yield different results in the game
without eavesdropping [15]. The discrete strategies version is a
direct extension of a previous model of eavesdropping by
Johnstone [7], in which hawk, dove and eavesdropping pheno-
types each arise from separate genotypes. In the continuous
strategies version, each genotype gives rise to a proportion of
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e31664individuals with the eavesdropping phenotype, a proportion with
the hawk phenotype, and a remaining proportion with the dove
phenotype. Our results suggest that eavesdropping will be most
favoured at intermediate relatedness and highlight the importance
of considering population structure in studying animal conflict and
the evolution of social information use.
Model and Results
Our model for the evolution of eavesdropping among related
individuals is based on the two-player hawk-dove game [17,18].
Animals frequently compete for resources with each other [19], and
the hawk-dove game is a well-studied approach to examining these
interactions. It has also been used previously to explore the
evolution of cooperation [16,20]. We model two variants of the
eavesdropping game played among relatives: one with discrete
strategies, and one with continuously variable strategies. In any
given interaction, each of the two players chooses between the
actionshawk and dove. Ifboth selecthawk then eachwinsthe resource
value v with probability 0.5 but otherwise bears a cost of fighting c,
so that the expected payoff is (v–c)/2 with c.v.0. (The analysis of
the case v.c.0, i.e. the prisoner’s dilemma with eavesdropping, is
not dissimilar but omitted here for brevity.) If both select dove then
eachwinstheresourcewith probability0.5without bearingthe costs
of fighting, giving an expected payoff of v/2. If one player chooses
hawkandtheotherdove,then the hawkwinstheresourcevaluev with
certainty, while the dove receives 0; both hawk and dove in this
scenarioavoid the cost offighting c.Notethattheseexpected payoffs
wouldbethe sameunderthecommonalternativeformulationofthe
hawk-dovegame in which the resource is split evenly between a pair
ofhawksora pairofdovesratherthanbeingrandomlyassigned;but
our eavesdropping strategy assumes the presence of a clear winner
to provide a potential source of information to eavesdropping
observers, as described below.
We assume an infinite population, where each individual plays a
large number of interactions over its lifetime before reproducing
clonally. The reproductive success or fitness of an individual is
proportional to the average payoff across all interactions during its
lifetime. There are no repeated interactions, but we allow for the
possibility of eavesdropping: an eavesdropper plays dove in any
interaction where the opponent’s prior encounter was perceived as
a win, and otherwise plays hawk.
Discrete strategies model
The discrete strategies model envisages three distinct genotypes,
each corresponding to a different strategy that may be thought of as
a phenotype.Anindividual with thehawkgenotypealways playsthe
action hawk; a dove always plays dove; and an eavesdropper plays the
conditional eavesdropping strategy, which may dictate either hawk
or dove in any given encounter. Johnstone’s original model [7]
assumes that opponents are drawn randomly from the whole
population, so that genotypes encounter one another in proportions
determined by their frequencies in the population. We allow for
non-random assortment by introducing relatednessas an exogenous
parameterreflecting,for example, limiteddispersal.The relatedness
r measures the probability that a player’s opponent has the same
genotype as the player, relative to the probability of obtaining the
same genotype in a randomly drawn member of the population.
This is a standard method of introducing relatedness in simple
game-theoretical models (e.g. [15,21,22]). Thus, an individual with
genotype i plays another type i individual with probability
rz(1{r)fi, ð1Þ
and plays an opponent of type j?i with probability
(1{r)fj, ð2Þ
where fi and fj are the frequencies of genotypes i and j in the
population. When r=1, pairs of players always have the same
genotype; when r=0, players interact with each genotype in
proportion to the population frequencies. Although relatedness
may, in principle, be negative (e.g. [23,24]), we restrict our analysis
to r[½0,1 . Note that r measures assortment at the level of the
genotype (i.e. hawk, dove or eavesdropper) rather than action (i.e.
hawk or dove)–f o re x a m p l e ,a ne a v e s d r o p p e rm e e t sa n o t h e r
eavesdropper with probability r+(1–r) fE, but in a given interaction
the two may or may not play the same action, since each player’s
action depends on the outcomeof its opponent’s previousencounter.
The probability pi that a type i individual won its last encounter
settlesdownafterrelativelyfewiterationsofthegame,andisgivenby
pE~
1zrz2fD(1{r)
4{2fE(1{r)
pH~
1zfD(1{r)
2{fE(1{r)
pD~
rzfD(1{r)
2{fE(1{r)
ð3Þ
with genotype frequencies fE+fH+fD=1. The derivation of these and
other expressions is provided in more detail in Material S1.
We use these probabilities to determine each genotype’s average
payoff as a function of the fi. We assume no mutation or drift, and
allow the frequencies of the eavesdropper, hawk and dove
genotypes to evolve according to standard continuous replicator
dynamics [25,26]. Solving for the frequencies that give equal
fitness to the three genotypes gives the following long-run
equilibrium frequencies:
fE~
4cv(r2zrz2)z4v2(r2zr{2){c2r(1{r)
c(1{r)(8vzc(1{r))
fH~
v
c
{
r
1{r
fD~
(c(1zr){v(1{r))(c(1{r){4rv)
c(1{r)(8vzc(1{r))
:
ð4Þ
When r=0, the model is identical to that in [7]. For positive r, all
three genotypes still coexist stably, at frequencies given by (4), as
long as
rvmin
c
4vzc
,
v
vzc

: ð5Þ
But if (5) does not hold, then (4) gives frequencies outside the range
[0,1], implying that one or more of the genotypes will be driven to
extinction or fixation. For v/c.0.5, eavesdroppers and hawks
coexist stably, with doves driven towards extinction over time, if
c
4vzc
ƒrv
4vzc
7cz4v
, ð6Þ
and eavesdroppers go to fixation if
4vzc
7cz4v
ƒrv
4v{c
4vzc
: ð7Þ
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4v{c
4vzc
,
v
vzc

, eavesdroppers and doves coexist stably,
with hawks driven towards extinction over time, if
8v(1{r){cr(1zr)
2w0, ð8Þ
otherwise doves go to fixation. Figures 1, 2 and 3 summarise these
equilibria as a function of r and v/c. A more detailed derivation
and description of these results is shown in Material S1.
If eavesdroppers make errors in determining the outcomes of
their adversaries’ prior encounters, we find that eavesdropping
peaks at a lower level of relatedness than in the absence of errors.
We model errors by introducing an ‘accuracy’ parameter a[½0:5,1 
describing the probability that an eavesdropper correctly perceives
anadversary’sprioroutcome (formalresults not shownbutavailable
from the authors on request). With probability a, an eavesdropper
perceives a win and plays dove when the adversary’s prior outcome
was truly a win, and perceives a loss and plays hawk when the prior
outcome was truly a loss; with probability (1 – a), the eavesdropper
perceives a win and plays dove when the prior outcome was actually
a loss, and perceives a loss and plays hawk when the prior outcome
was actually a win. At low relatedness, errors make eavesdropping
more attractive if fight costs are low since the population is
dominated by eavesdroppers and hawks, and errors allow an
eavesdropper to avoid some escalated fights when playing another
eavesdropper, although this is partly offset by greater average fight
costs when encountering a hawk. If fight costs and/or relatedness
are high, eavesdroppers and doves dominate the population, and
errors increase the rate of escalated fights among pairs of
eavesdroppers, thus selecting against eavesdropping.
In the model with eavesdropping, individual aggression (i.e.
hawk actions) and escalated conflicts (i.e. hawk-hawk encounters)
generally occur at higher frequency than in the model without
eavesdropping (Figure 4; see also Material S1). As in previous work
[7], there is an incentive for more aggression than would otherwise
occur, since this improves a player’s chance of winning future
encounters with eavesdroppers. However, at low relatedness, the
frequency of escalated conflict is lower than would be expected
given the frequency of individual aggression, essentially since
eavesdroppers are able to avoid conflict against aggressive
opponents. At intermediate relatedness, this is more than offset
by the fact that aggressive individuals interact among themselves
more often than would be expected by chance, so that the
frequency of escalated conflict is higher than might be expected
(see Material S1). At high relatedness, doves go to fixation and
there is no aggression or escalated conflict at all.
In contrast to the model of Johnstone [7], the discrete strategies
model with relatedness can produce lower frequencies of individual
aggression (i.e. hawk actions) and escalated conflict (i.e. hawk-hawk
encounters) than the model without eavesdropping. This happens
within a narrow range of parameters, when fighting is not very
costly (v/c close to 1), eavesdropping is very error prone (a close to
0.5) and there is moderate population structure as captured by r.
This combination of parameters produces an equilibrium with
fewer hawks than in the model without eavesdropping, i.e. [15]. In
the model with eavesdropping, however, individual aggression also
includes any eavesdroppers that play the hawk action. With a close
to 0.5, eavesdroppers are essentially choosing randomly between
hawk and dove in each interaction, so individual aggression is the
frequency of hawks plus approximately half of the frequency of
eavesdroppers. Escalated aggression in the model without
eavesdroppers is just the frequency of hawk-hawk interactions
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
r 0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
v/c
D E + D
E E + H
E + H + D
Figure 1. Phenotypes in equilibrium in the discrete strategies
model. Labels indicate genotypes with positive equilibrium frequen-
cies under error-free eavesdropping (a=1) with E=eavesdroppers,
H=hawks and D=doves.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031664.g001
Eavesdroppers
Hawks
Doves
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
r
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
freq
r
Eavesdroppers
freq
Doves
Hawks
0.0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
A
B
Figure2.Equilibriumphenotypefrequenciesforv/c=0.75under
error-free eavesdropping (a=1). Panel A: results for the discrete
strategies model. Panel B: results for the continuous strategies model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031664.g002
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eavesdroppers play the hawk action must also be taken into
account. The frequencies of individual aggression and escalated
conflict are lower than in the model without eavesdropping
provided that eavesdroppers are sufficiently abundant in equilib-
rium, and that low costs of fighting ensure that hawks are
abundant in the non-eavesdropping model.
Continuous strategies model
In the continuous strategies model, a genotype i displays
phenotypic plasticity as described by two parameters, xi[½0,1  and
yi[½0,1 . We assume phenotypic noise at birth such that, when each
genotype i individual is born, it becomes a hawk, dove or
eavesdropper at random but with probabilities determined by its
genotype (xi,yi). Of the genotype i individuals, a proportion xi takes
onaneavesdropperphenotypeforlifeand thusplaysthe conditional
eavesdropping strategy in every interaction. A proportion (1-xi)yi
takes on the hawk phenotype and thus always plays the action hawk;
likewise a proportion (1-xi)(1-yi) takes on the dove phenotype and so
always plays the action dove. Since the relevant evolutionary
dynamics in our model take place at the genotype level, the fitness
of genotype i is the weighted average fitness of its three phenotypes,
where phenotype fitness is again measured as the average across all
interactions during an individual’s lifetime.
As in the discrete strategies model, we allow for non-random
assortment among genotypes arising from, say, limited dispersal, by
permitting non-zero relatedness. The exogenous relatedness
parameter r measures the probability that a player’s opponent has
the same genotype as the player, relative to the probability of
drawing the same genotype randomly from the population. An
individual with genotype i plays another type i individual with
probability r+(12r) fi, and plays an opponent of type j?i with
probability (12r) fj, where fi and fj are the frequencies of genotypes i
and j in the population. In the continuous strategies model,
genotypes i and j will be a resident genotype close to fixation and a
mutant genotype at low frequency, since our equilibrium analysis
will concentrate on finding genotypes that cannot be invaded by
‘nearby’ mutants. We again restrict attention to r[½0,1 . Note that
assortment takes place at the genotype level, and when two players
have the same genotype this means that they share the same values
forx andy. However,at the time ofthe interaction,theirphenotypes
are already determined as eavesdropper, hawk or dove, and the two
players may or may not share the same phenotype. Additionally –
just as in the discrete model – two eavesdroppers may or may not
play the same action against one another.
To analyse our eavesdropping model when we have continuous
strategies, we use evolutionary invasion analysis [27], also known
as adaptive dynamics [28,29,30]. This assumes homogeneous
populations, rare mutants and small phenotypic effects from
mutations. It allows us to investigate whether a mutant is able to
invade a monomorphic population with a slightly different
genotype and go to fixation. If mutations are small, and rare
relative to the time to fixation, the genotype making up the
population can move around the genotype space over time via a
large number of small evolutionary steps. We thus seek the
evolutionary attractors for our genotype space [28,29,30].
As for the discrete strategies model, we start with expressions for
the probability that a player has won its last encounter as a
function of the resident’s genotype, and use these to construct
expressions for the expected fitness of a resident and a mutant as
wres~wE,resxreszwH,res(1{xres)yreszwD,res(1{xres)(1{yres) ð9Þ
and
wmut~wE,mutxmutzwH,mut(1{xmut)ymutzwD,mut(1{xmut)
(1{ymut)
ð10Þ
Figure 3. Equilibrium phenotype frequencies under error-free eavesdropping (a=1). Panels A, B, C: frequencies of eavesdroppers, hawks
and doves in the discrete strategies model. Panels D, E, F: frequencies of eavesdroppers, hawks and doves in the continuous strategies model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031664.g003
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functions of relatedness r, as a mutant will either interact with
an individual of its own genotype (with probability r) or with an
individual with the resident genotype (with probability 1–r, since
the resident genotype is assumed to be at fixation when the mutant
appears). The relative fitness W of a mutant is the difference
between the mutant’s fitness and the weighted average fitness of
the population, i.e. W=wmut2(swmut+(12s)wres), where s is the
frequency of the mutant in the population. To assess the
susceptibility of genotypes to invasion by mutants, we assume
that the mutant is rare (i.e. s?0), and so W simplifies to
W<wmut2wres. We can then use this to derive the selection
gradients, Wx and Wy, and find equilibrium values of xi and yi by
solving the first order conditions:
Wx~
LW
Lxmut xmut~xres,ymut~yres
    ~0 ð11Þ
and
Wy~
LW
Lymut xmut~xres,ymut~yres
    ~0 ð12Þ
for x[½0,1  and y[½0,1 , which provides the parameters for the
equilibrium genotype. Material S1 provides more details of the
derivation. This approach assumes a homogeneous population
(where mutants are at a negligible density relative to resident
individuals), that mutants with a positive invasion fitness (that is,
those that do better than the resident strategy) will successfully
invade and be driven to fixation, and that mutation occurs in small
steps, with xmut and ymut deviating only slightly from xres and yres
[28,29,30]. This model thus differs conceptually from the discrete
strategies model, in which the population was genotypically
heterogeneous at equilibrium.
Without population structure (r=0), there is a single equilibrium
genotype that gives rise to eavesdropper, hawk and dove
phenotypes in accordance with parameters x
*=8v(c2v)/(c
2+8cv)
and y
*=v(c+8v)/(c
2+8v
2). These phenotype frequencies match the
genotype frequencies of both our discrete strategies model and
Johnstone’s eavesdropping model [7].
Our results differ, however, when we incorporate relatedness into
the population (i.e. r.0). As relatedness increases, the equilibrium
genotype parameter y
* falls, since avoiding escalated conflicts by
playing dove is always more favourable when interactions with
relatives become more common. If the value of the resource v is
sufficiently high compared to the cost of fighting c, then the
equilibrium eavesdropping frequency x
* peaks at intermediate levels
of relatedness before dropping to 0 when relatedness reaches 1
(Figure 2). Unlike the discrete strategies model, however, eaves-
dropping never goes to fixation. The peak frequency of eavesdrop-
pingoccurs at lower relatedness thesmallerisv/c;i fv/c issufficiently
small then the frequency of eavesdropping decreases monotonically
to 0 as r increases (Figure 3).
When eavesdroppers make errors in determining the outcomes of
their adversaries’ prior encounters, we find that the equilibrium
frequency of eavesdropping peaks at a lower level of relatedness
compared to error-freeeavesdroppingor,ifv/c issmall,islowerat all
values of r. As with the discrete strategies model, we model these
errors by introducing an ‘accuracy’ parameter a[½0:5,1 ,d e s c r i b i n g
the probability that an eavesdropper correctly perceives an
adversary’s prior outcome (formal results not shown but available
from the authors on request). The equilibrium frequency of
eavesdroppers may actually increase with eavesdropping errors
when relatedness is low and v/c high, since errors cause
eavesdroppers to avoid some escalated fights against other
eavesdroppers, and this is favourable. The frequencies of both
individual aggression and escalated conflict are always higher in the
eavesdropping model than in the model without eavesdropping
(Figure 4; see also Material S1), but the frequency of escalated
conflict is less than would be expected from simply squaring the
frequency of individual aggression. As eavesdropping errors increase
(i.e. a approaches 0.5), aggression and escalated conflict converge to
the same level as observed in the model without eavesdropping,
although eavesdropping still takes place in equilibrium.
Discussion
Although players cannot distinguish kin from non-kin directly in
our model, nor accurately predict what action an opponent will
choose in a future encounter, eavesdropping provides scope for a
conditional response such that hawk is played against opponents
that are on average comparatively likely to play dove, and vice versa.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
freq
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
freq
0.0 r
r
Eavesdropping
model, α = 1
Eavesdropping
model, α = 1
Eavesdropping
model, α = 0.75
Eavesdropping
model, α = 0.75
Model without
eavesdropping
Model without
eavesdropping
A
B
Figure 4. Frequency of escalated conflicts for v/c=0.75.
Escalated conflicts are interactions in which both players play the
action hawk. Panel A: frequencies for the discrete strategies model.
Panel B: frequencies for the continuous strategies model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031664.g004
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intermediate levels of relatedness. By contrast, at high relatedness,
individuals maximise their inclusive fitness by always playing dove,
which consequently goes to fixation. This is similar to the basic
hawk-dove game, in the absence of eavesdropping, in which doves
also go to fixation if relatedness is high – i.e. if r$v/(v+c) under
discrete strategies, and if r=1 under continuous strategies [15]. It
also echoes the classic result in the general 262 game where the
broad pattern of a stable polymorphism at intermediate related-
ness and a monomorphic equilibrium at high relatedness is
associated with negatively additive payoffs [15,31,32]. The formal
extension of that result to our models may be useful in placing
eavesdropping in the context of more general 363 games, but is
complicated by the presence of three actions rather than two, and
the fact that payoffs are themselves a function of population
frequencies (via the probability of winning a previous encounter).
In our models, eavesdropping yields no useful information at
high relatedness, since eavesdroppers essentially face a uniform
population of adversaries whose members are otherwise interact-
ing only with each other: eavesdropping relatives in the discrete
strategies case, or doves in the continuous strategies case.
Consequently, rare eavesdroppers play hawk and dove with equal
probability but their choice in any encounter is uncorrelated with
their opponent’s choice in that encounter. They fare strictly worse
than doves under discrete strategies because they sometimes bear
the cost of fighting in escalated conflicts, and are unable to
increase in frequency under continuous strategies for the same
reason. At low relatedness, negative frequency dependent selection
means that neither eavesdroppers, hawks nor doves can go to
fixation, consistent with Johnstone [7] in which relatedness is zero.
A resident population of hawks can be invaded by either doves or
eavesdroppers; doves can be invaded by either eavesdroppers or
hawks; and eavesdroppers can also be invaded by hawks (and by
doves, but only when the relative cost of fighting is high,
specifically v/c#4).
Interacting with relatives relaxes the frequency dependence that
maintains all three strategies in equilibrium with zero relatedness.
Although this result is borne out qualitatively in both the discrete-
and continuous strategies models, the equilibria of the two models
differ when relatedness is positive. For example, the discrete
strategies model allows eavesdroppers or doves to go to fixation
given suitable model parameters; under the continuous strategies
model eavesdroppers never go to fixation, and doves only become
fixed at r=1. This contrasts with the case where there is no
relatedness (i.e. r=0), in which the genotype frequencies under
discrete strategies are the same as the respective probabilities
under continuous strategies, and eavesdropping never goes to
fixation [7]. This divergence between discrete and continuous
models in structured populations is also a known feature of the
hawk-dove game without eavesdropping [15].
The equilibrium frequency of eavesdropping may be regarded
as a measure of the value of eavesdropping for a given set of model
parameters. This differs from the usual measure of the value of
eavesdropping, which is the selection gradient given model
parameters and genotype frequencies – that is, the fitness of an
eavesdropping player relative to hawks or doves under discrete
strategies or, in the case of continuous strategies, the change in
genotype fitness from a small increase in the proportion of
eavesdropping progeny. The selection gradient varies with the
frequencies of eavesdroppers, hawks and doves, and also with v/c
and r. When the gradient is positive, selection favours an increase
in the frequency of eavesdropping which tends to erode the value
of eavesdropping, since eavesdropping opponents are compara-
tively unpredictable [7]. However, the selection gradient will be
zero at any equilibrium where eavesdroppers attain frequency
strictly between zero and one. It is therefore useful for examining
the evolutionary dynamics of eavesdropping, but less helpful for
comparing the adaptive value of eavesdropping between different
biological settings as captured by parameters v/c and r in our
models. The equilibrium frequency of eavesdroppers, on the other
hand, is useful for this purpose.
The value of eavesdropping as measured by the selection
gradient is closely related to the value of information in our model
[33,34]. The value of eavesdropping is the benefit of observing a
simple social cue and responding in a specified way – i.e. play hawk
(dove) against perceived losers (winners) – which may be positive or
negative. In contrast, the value of information is the net fitness
benefit from responding optimally once observations have reduced
prior uncertainty, and is always non-negative [35]. The value of
eavesdropping is non-negative and equivalent to the value of
information if the outcome of fights is a sufficiently reliable
predictor of opponents’ future actions that it is optimal to play
hawk (dove) against perceived losers (winners). But if the outcomes
of fights are sufficiently misinformative about the likelihood of an
opponent playing hawk or dove in subsequent fights, the optimal
response to the social cue may be either to play hawk or to play dove
unconditionally – in other words, to ignore the social cue. In this
case, the value of information is zero, since receiving the cue
changes neither choice of action nor outcome. But the value of
eavesdropping is negative, since the response conditioned on the
social cue yields lower fitness than the best unconditional response
that could be employed without such cue. The value of
eavesdropping may be negative (and the value of information
zero) when cues fail to reduce prior uncertainty sufficiently (are too
uninformative) about whether a current opponent won or lost in a
previous round, and/or when knowing this fails to improve payoffs
from current and future bouts.
The value of eavesdropping (and, correspondingly, the value of
information), involves a number of components. Firstly, an
immediate direct fitness effect from altering the player’s payoff
in the current round, by enabling the player to distinguish (albeit
imperfectly) opponents who are more likely to play hawk from
those who are more likely to play dove. The size of this effect is
determined by the frequencies of eavesdroppers, hawks and doves,
the relative payoffs (influencing the value of any available
information) which are functions of v/c, as well as the probabilities
that each type won its last encounter, since these affect the average
ability of an eavesdropping player to predict whether an opponent
will play hawk or dove (the availability of information). Secondly, a
fitness effect arising from a mutant effectively facing a different
population of opponents than a resident (impacting both value and
availability of information). Thirdly, an accumulation of effects in
future rounds because an increased probability of winning this
round also implies an increased probability of winning against an
eavesdropper in the next round, since an eavesdropper plays dove if
it perceives that its opponent won its last encounter. The net result
of all these effects is captured in the relative fitness functions for the
different genotypes.
Our models highlight the potential for relatedness to enhance
selection for eavesdropping. The relatedness parameter r describes
the probability of interacting with a similar partner in a given
interaction, relative to chance. While we have not specified how
such relatedness arises, the mechanisms invoked in the kin
selection literature usually involve either kin recognition or limited
dispersal [12,22,36]. Our r is best interpreted as arising from
limited dispersal, since we only model interactions with a single
level of relatedness. Many species face dispersal limitations, which
may help suppress conflict by increasing the relatedness of
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relatives also compete to reproduce or for other resources
[37,38,39]. We have chosen to keep our model simple, and thus
assume that any resource competition is relatively global (i.e. non-
dispersal limited) compared to the conflict stage captured by our
game. Such global competition, with local social interactions,
would likely be found in, for example, interactions between
nestmates or between young raised on a territory, prior to dispersal
and competition for mates or territories [39].
Our models, in which direct assessment of relatedness or
strategy is unavailable, predict that eavesdropping will be most
favoured at intermediate levels of population structure. More
generally, our results highlight the importance of explicitly
considering genetic relatedness in addition to the nature and
extent of social interactions when exploring the evolution of
cognitive abilities. (While more demanding behaviours can easily
be found – for example among corvids and primates –
eavesdropping likely represents a significant cognitive challenge,
at a minimum requiring recognition of individuals and the
capacity to process and remember past observations of those
individuals.) We suggest that our predictions can be tested directly.
Earley and Dugatkin [9] have already demonstrated eavesdrop-
ping in the green swordtail Xiphophorus helleri. One test of our model
would be to repeat the same experimental protocol with X. helleri
but to vary the degree of relatedness among each trio of lab-raised
fish. An alternative test would be to select several Xiphophorus
species that exhibit different degrees of population structure and to
repeat the same experimental protocol across those species. More
indirect evidence might come from examining brain size or
cognitive capacity as a function of population structure for each
species, since some authors have argued that larger brains evolved
in part to process the demands of living in a highly social
environment [40,41,42].
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